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h i g h l i g h t s
• The government wants two tasks to be performed.
• In each task, unobservable effort can be exerted by a wealth-constrained private contractor.
• If the government faces no binding budget constraints, it is optimal to bundle the tasks.
• If the government has only a limited budget, it may be optimal to separate the tasks.
• High efforts in both tasks can then be implemented with smaller bonus payments.
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a b s t r a c t
The government wants two tasks to be performed. In each task, unobservable effort can be exerted by a
wealth-constrainedprivate contractor. If the government faces no binding budget constraints, it is optimal
to bundle the tasks. The contractor in charge of both tasks then gets a bonus payment if and only if both
tasks are successful. Yet, if the government has only a limited budget, it may be optimal to separate the
tasks, so that there are two contractors each in charge of one task. In this case, high efforts in both tasks
can be implemented with smaller bonus payments.
© 2013 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.N1. Introduction
An important question in public procurement is whether the
government should bundle different tasks together and let one
private contractor be responsible for these tasks, or whether
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Open access under CC BY-NC-the government should contract with different private parties
each in charge of only one task.1 The present paper reconsiders
the bundling decision in a model where the principal (i.e., the
government) has only a limited budget. In an influential paper,
Hart (2003) has argued that financing issues may be secondary in
the context of public–private partnerships, since the government
has ‘‘enormous powers of taxation’’ (Hart, 2003, p. C75). Yet,
in times of financial crises, governments may well face binding
budget constraints. The purpose of the present study is to explore
1 For discussions of bundling in public procurement, see e.g. Hart (2003), Bennett
and Iossa (2006), Chen and Chiu (2010), Iossa and Martimort (2012), and De Brux
and Desrieux (forthcoming).
D license.
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decision.2
In the principal–agent literature, many authors have studied
moral hazard problems in which the agent is risk neutral but
wealth constrained, such that a ‘‘limited liability rent’’must be paid
to motivate an agent to exert high effort (see Laffont and Marti-
mort, 2002). In most papers, only the agent is wealth constrained,
while the principal faces no (binding)wealth constraints.3 When in
such a framework two technologically independent tasks have to
be performed, bundling these tasksmay reduce the limited liability
rent that the principal has to pay in order to induce high efforts. If
one agent is in charge of both tasks, the principal must pay a bonus
only if both tasks are successful. In contrast, if two different agents
are each in charge of one task, then the principal must also pay a
bonus if only one agent is successful.4
Yet, if the principal has only a limited budget which she can use
for making payments to the agent(s), then she may be better off
when she does not bundle the tasks. The intuition for this novel
finding is as follows. If one agent is in charge of both tasks, the
payment that the principal has to make if both tasks are successful
may be so large that the principal cannot afford to induce the agent
to exert high efforts in both tasks. In contrast, if there are two
agents each in charge of one task, the principal can induce both
agents to exert high efforts, since now thepayments can be smaller,
as they are also paid when only one task is successful.
2. The model
Consider a principal (a government agency) who wants two
tasks to be performed in order to improve the provision of public
goods. In each task i ∈ {1, 2}, unobservable effort ei ∈ {el, eh} can
be exerted, where 0 < el < 12 < eh < 1. Effort in task i leads
to a success (yi = 1) with probability ei and to a failure (yi = 0)
otherwise. A success in task i yields a non-monetary benefit b to the
principal, capturing the improved quality of public good provision.
A failure yields no benefit to the principal. The outcome yi of each
task is verifiable.
The principal can either decide to have one agent in charge of
both tasks (bundling), or to have two different agents in charge of
the two different tasks (separation). An agent’s effort costs in a task
i are given byψ > 0 if high effort is chosen and by 0 if low effort is
chosen. Note that the two tasks are technologically unrelated. All
parties are risk neutral and the reservation utilities are given by
zero. Moreover, we assume that the agents have no wealth and are
protected by limited liability; i.e., payments to the agents must be
non-negative.
If the principal decides to bundle the tasks, then a contract is
given by (w11, w10, w01, w00), where wy1y2 denotes the payment
from the principal to the agent given the outcomes y1 of task 1 and
y2 of task 2. Analogously, if the principal hires agent A to perform
task 1 and agent B to perform task 2, the contracts are given by
(wA11, w
A
10, w
A
01, w
A
00) for agent A and (w
B
11, w
B
10, w
B
01, w
B
00) for agent
B.
Finally, our key assumption is that also the principal has limited
resources. This assumption distinguishes the present paper from
previous studies on public procurement contracting with limited
liability.5 Specifically, the payment to the agent in the case of
2 In a model encompassing agency problems and property rights, Martimort and
Pouyet (2008) find that the question of whether tasks are bundled may be more
important than the ownership structure. For discussions of public versus private
ownership in incomplete contracting frameworks, see Hart et al. (1997) and Hoppe
and Schmitz (2010).
3 See Innes (1990) for an exception. Yet, Innes (1990) does not analyze bundling
of tasks.
4 See e.g. Bolton and Dewatripont (2005, Section 6.2.2), when their parameter γ
is zero. For experimental evidence, see the ‘‘no conflict’’ treatments in Hoppe and
Kusterer (2011).
5 See e.g. Martimort and Straub (2012) and Hoppe and Schmitz (2013).bundling and the sum of the payments that the principal makes
to the agents in the case of separation must not be larger than the
principal’s budgetW .
Throughout, we suppose that the principal’s benefit b is
sufficiently large to make high effort attractive for the principal
to implement even in a second-best world in which effort is
unobservable.6
Assumption 1. b > ehψ/(eh − el)2.
3. Bundling
Let us first suppose the principal contracts with only one agent
to perform both tasks. The agent’s expected payoff when he exerts
high effort in both tasks is given by
uhh = e2hw11 + eh(1− eh)(w10 + w01)+ (1− eh)2w00 − 2ψ.
When the agent exerts high effort in task 1 and low effort in task
2, his expected payoff is
uhl = ehelw11 + eh(1− el)w10
+ (1− eh)elw01 + (1− eh)(1− el)w00 − ψ.
Analogously, when the agent chooses low effort in task 1 and high
effort in task 2, his expected payoff is
ulh = elehw11 + (1− el)ehw01 + el(1− eh)w10
+ (1− el)(1− eh)w00 − ψ.
Finally, when the agent chooses low effort in both tasks, his
expected payoff is given by
ull = e2l w11 + el(1− el)(w10 + w01)+ (1− el)2w00.
High effort in both tasks can be implemented if it is possible
to simultaneously satisfy the incentive compatibility constraints
uhh ≥ uhl, uhh ≥ ulh, uhh ≥ ull and the constraints that the
payments must be non-negative and smaller than the budgetW .7
The principal’s expected payoff when high effort in both tasks is
implemented is given by
2ehb− e2hw11 − eh(1− eh)(w10 + w01)− (1− eh)2w00.
It is straightforward to see that it is optimal for the principal to
set w00 = 0 and w10 = w01 =: w1. The incentive compatibility
constraints uhh ≥ uhl and uhh ≥ ulh can thus be written as
w11 ≥ CI(w1) := ψeh(eh − el) +
2eh − 1
eh
w1
and the incentive compatibility constraint uhh ≥ ull can be written
as
w11 ≥ CII(w1) := 2ψe2h − e2l
− 21− eh − el
eh + el w1.
Lemma 1. Suppose that the two tasks are bundled and the principal
wants to implement high effort in both tasks.
6 The expected total surplus is 2(ehb − ψ) if high effort is exerted in both tasks,
(eh + el)b − ψ if high effort is exerted in only one task, and 2elb if low effort is
exerted in both tasks. Thus, in a first-best world, high effort in both tasks would
be chosen whenever b ≥ ψ/(eh − el), while low effort in both tasks would be
chosen otherwise. Yet, it will become clear in Section 4 that in the second-best
world under separation the principal would never implement high effort if b <
ehψ/(eh − el)2 . Hence, if Assumption 1 is violated, separation cannot be strictly
better than bundling.
7 Throughout, participation constraints are redundant, as they are implied by
incentive compatibility and non-negativity of the payments.
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in both tasks whenever W ≥ 2ψ/(e2h − e2l ). In this case, she sets
w11 = 2ψ/(e2h − e2l ) and w1 = 0, yielding the expected payoff
2ehb− 2ψe2h/(e2h − e2l ).
(ii) Suppose that eh+el < 1. The principal can implement high effort
in both taskswhenever W ≥ 2ψ/(eh−el). If W ≥ 2ψ/(e2h−e2l ),
the wages and the principal’s expected payoff are as in case (i).
If 2ψ/(eh − el) ≤ W < 2ψ/(e2h − e2l ), the principal sets
w11 = W andw1 = 2ψ−(e
2
h−e2l )W
2(1−eh−el)(eh−el) , yielding the expected payoff
2ehb− e2hW − eh(1− eh) 2ψ−(e
2
h−e2l )W
(1−eh−el)(eh−el) .
Proof. The principal’s problem is to maximize 2ehb − e2hw11 −
2eh(1 − eh)w1 subject to the constraints w11 ≥ CI(w1), w11 ≥
CII(w1), 0 ≤ w11 ≤ W , and 0 ≤ w1 ≤ W .
Consider case (i). Note that CII(w1) is increasing. Hence, the
constraintsw11 ≥ CII(w1) andw11 ≤ W cannot be simultaneously
satisfied if W < 2ψ/(e2h − e2l ), so under this condition it is
impossible to implement high effort in both tasks. Suppose W ≥
2ψ/(e2h − e2l ). Ignore for a moment the constraint w11 ≥ CI(w1).
Then the constraints w11 ≥ CII(w1) and w1 ≥ 0 must be binding,
since otherwise the principal’s expected payoff could be increased
by reducingw11 (resp.,w1), whichwould not violate the remaining
constraints. Thus, the solution to the principal’s relaxed problem
is w11 = 2ψ/(e2h − e2l ) and w1 = 0. It is easy to see that this
solution also satisfies the omitted constraint w11 ≥ CI(w1), so we
have found the solution to the principal’s original maximization
problem.
Consider now case (ii). Note that CII(w1) is decreasing, CI(w1)
is increasing, and CII(0) > CI(0). Moreover, if w1 = ψ/(eh − el),
then CI(w1) = CII(w1) = 2ψ/(eh − el). Hence, it is impossible
to simultaneously satisfy the constraints w11 ≥ CI(w1), w11 ≥
CII(w1), and w11 ≤ W if W < 2ψ/(eh − el). Suppose that W ≥
CII(0) = 2ψ/(e2h− e2l ). Ignore for a moment the constraintsw11 ≥
CI(w1), 0 ≤ w11 ≤ W , andw1 ≤ W . The constraintw11 ≥ CII(w1)
must be binding, since otherwise the principal’s expected payoff
could be increased by reducingw11. The principal’s problem is then
tomaximize 2ehb−e2h( 2ψe2h−e2l −2
1−eh−el
eh+el w1)−2eh(1−eh)w1 subject
tow1 ≥ 0,which is solved byw1 = 0. It is straightforward to check
that the solutionw1 = 0, w11 = 2ψ/(e2h−e2l ) satisfies the omitted
constraints. Next, suppose that 2ψ/(eh−el) ≤ W < 2ψ/(e2h−e2l ).
Ignore for a moment the constraints w11 ≥ CI(w1), 0 ≤ w11,
and 0 ≤ w1 ≤ W . The constraint w11 ≥ CII(w1) must again be
binding. The principal’s problem is to maximize 2ehb− e2h( 2ψe2h−e2l −
2 1−eh−eleh+el w1)−2eh(1−eh)w1 subject tow11 ≤ W . The principal thus
makesw1 as small as possible given thatw11 = CII(w1) ≤ W must
hold. The solution is given by w11 = W , w1 = 2ψ−(e
2
h−e2l )W
2(1−eh−el)(eh−el) ,
which also satisfies the omitted constraints. 
Of course, the principal can always implement loweffort in both
tasks by setting all wages equal to zero, so her expected payoff is
2elb. Moreover, the principal may want to implement high effort
in only one task, say task 1. Then she maximizes
(eh + el)b− ehelw11 − eh(1− el)w10 − (1− eh)elw01
− (1− eh)(1− el)w00
subject to the incentive compatibility constraints uhl ≥ uhh, uhl ≥
ulh, uhl ≥ ull as well as the constraints that the payments must
be non-negative and smaller than the budget W . Ignore for a
moment the constraints uhl ≥ uhh and uhl ≥ ulh. The principal
then maximizes her expected payoff subject to el(w11 − w01) +
(1 − el)(w10 − w00) ≥ ψ/(eh − el) and the constraints on the
payments. Hence, she sets w00 = w01 = 0. The principal can
implement high effort in one task and low effort in the other taskwhenever W ≥ ψ/(eh − el). In this case, it is optimal for her to
set w11 = w10 = ψ/(eh − el). It is easy to check that the omitted
constraints are also satisfied. The principal’s expected payoff then
is (eh + el)b− ehψ/(eh − el).
Note that the principal’s expected payoff when she implements
high effort in only one task is strictly larger than her expected
payoff when she implements low effort in both tasks if and only
if b > ehψ/(eh − el)2, which holds according to Assumption 1.
Thus, the principal implements low effort in both tasks only if
W < ψ/(eh − el). Moreover, under Assumption 1 the principal’s
expected payoff when she implements high effort in both tasks
is larger than when she implements high effort in only one task.
Hence, the principal always implements high effort in as many
tasks as possible, so that the maximum expected payoffs that the
principal can attain under bundling are as follows.
Proposition 2. Suppose the two tasks are bundled.
(i) Suppose that eh + el ≥ 1. The principal’s maximum expected
payoff is
Πbundle =

2ehb− 2ψe
2
h
e2h − e2l
if
2ψ
e2h − e2l
≤ W ,
(eh + el)b− ehψeh − el
if
ψ
eh − el ≤ W <
2ψ
e2h − e2l
,
2elb if W <
ψ
eh − el .
(ii) Suppose that eh + el < 1. The principal’s maximum expected
payoff is
Πbundle =

2ehb− 2ψe
2
h
e2h − e2l
if
2ψ
e2h − e2l
≤ W ,
2ehb− e2hW − eh(1− eh)
× 2ψ − (e
2
h − e2l )W
(1− eh − el)(eh − el)
if
2ψ
eh − el ≤ W <
2ψ
e2h − e2l
,
(eh + el)b− ehψeh − el
if
ψ
eh − el ≤ W <
2ψ
eh − el ,
2elb if W <
ψ
eh − el .
4. Separation
Let us now consider the case of separation, such that agent A is
in charge of task 1 while another agent B is in charge of task 2.
Suppose first the principal wants to implement high effort in
both tasks. She maximizes her expected payoff
2ehb− e2h(wA11 + wB11)− eh(1− eh)(wA10 + wB10
+wA01 + wB01)− (1− eh)2(wA00 + wB00)
subject to the incentive compatibility constraints
e2hw
A
11 + eh(1− eh)(wA10 + wA01)+ (1− eh)2wA00 − ψ
≥ elehwA11 + el(1− eh)wA10 + (1− el)ehwA01
+ (1− el)(1− eh)wA00,
e2hw
B
11 + eh(1− eh)(wB10 + wB01)+ (1− eh)2wB00 − ψ
≥ ehelwB11 + eh(1− el)wB10 + (1− eh)elwB01
+ (1− eh)(1− el)wB00,
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wAy1y2 + wBy1y2 ≤ W , for y1 ∈ {0, 1}, y2 ∈ {0, 1}. It is easy to
verify that in a solution wA00 = wA01 = wB00 = wB10 = 0 and
ehwA11+(1−eh)wA10 = ehwB11+(1−eh)wB01 = ψ/(eh−el)must hold.
Hence, the principal’s expected payoff from implementing high ef-
fort in both tasks is 2eh(b − ψ/(eh − el)). Note that high effort in
both tasks is implementablewheneverW ≥ 2ψ/[(2−eh)(eh−el)],
since the principal can setwA11 = wB11 = ψ/[(2− eh)(eh− el)] and
wA10 = wB01 = 2ψ/[(2− eh)(eh − el)].
Suppose now the principal implements high effort in only one
task, say task 1. It is straightforward to see that she will make
no payments to agent B. The incentive compatibility constraint of
agent A reads
ehelwA11 + eh(1− el)wA10 + (1− eh)elwA01
+ (1− eh)(1− el)wA00 − ψ
≥ e2l wA11 + el(1− el)(wA10 + wA01)+ (1− el)2wA00.
Thus, it is optimal for the principal to set wA00 = wA01 = 0 and
wA11 = wA10 = ψ/(eh − el). The principal’s expected payoff then is
(eh + el)b− ehψ/(eh − el). Note that high effort in only one task is
implementable wheneverW ≥ ψ/(eh − el).
Finally, the principal can always implement low effort in both
tasks by setting all payments to zero. Her expected payoff then
is 2elb. The principal’s expected payoff when she implements
high effort in only one task is strictly larger than when she
implements low effort in both tasks if and only if b > ehψ/(eh −
el)2, which is satisfied according to Assumption 1. Moreover,
under Assumption 1 the principal’s expected payoff when she
implements high effort in both tasks is larger than when she
implements high effort in only one task. Hence, the following result
holds.
Proposition 3. Suppose the two tasks are separated. The principal’s
maximum expected payoff is
Π sep =

2eh

b− ψ
eh − el

if
2ψ
(2− eh)(eh − el) ≤ W ,
(eh + el)b− ehψeh − el
if
ψ
eh − el ≤ W <
2ψ
(2− eh)(eh − el) ,
2elb if W <
ψ
eh − el .
5. Bundling versus separation
We can now state our main result, which follows immediately
from a comparison of the principal’s expected payoffs as charac-
terized in Propositions 2 and 3.
Proposition 4. (i) Suppose that eh + el ≥ 1. If W > 2ψ/(e2h −
e2l ), then the principal strictly prefers bundling. If 2ψ/[(2 − eh)(eh−el)] < W < 2ψ/(e2h−e2l ), then the principal strictly prefers
separation. Otherwise, the principal is indifferent between the two
modes.
(ii) Suppose that eh + el < 1. If W > 2ψ/(eh − el), then the
principal strictly prefers bundling. If 2ψ/[(2 − eh)(eh − el)] <
W < 2ψ/(eh − el), then the principal strictly prefers separation.
Otherwise, the principal is indifferent between the two modes.
Hence, if the principal does not face a relevant budget constraint
(i.e., ifW is sufficiently large), it is optimal for her to bundle the two
tasks. This result is in linewith the existing literature onmulti-task
moral hazard problemswith wealth-constrained agents. However,
when the principal has only a limited budget, a new effect arises.
Separation can now be optimal, because it may allow the principal
to implement high efforts in both tasks even when in the case of
bundling she could implement high effort in one task only.8
Intuitively, in the case of bundling, the principal must make a
very large payment to the agent when both tasks are successful. In
contrast, under separation the payments can be smaller, since each
agent can also be incentivized with a payment that is made if the
other agent is not successful, so that the payments can be spread
more evenly over the different states of the world.
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